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ABSTRACT. A Credit Default Swap spread is a reliable measure of credit risk as it is the 
compensation demanded by a party to bear this risk. Officially, credit risk is denoted as credit 
ratings announced by credit rating agencies. Since rating announcements contain information 
regarding credit risk, the market should incorporate this new information into the CDS spread. 
The aim of this study is to investigate if the CDS spread reacts differently to credit rating 
announcements during periods of global financial distress than under relative financial 
stability. The study covers a period between November 26, 2004 to November 13, 2014. By 
conducting an event study, 300 679 daily credit default swap spreads and 370 Moody´s credit 
rating events from 120 entities in the North American credit default swap market are analyzed 
over three time periods: (1) prior to the global Sub-prime crisis of 2008-2009, (2) during the 
crisis and (3) after the crisis. Specifically, the announcement types, upgrade, possible upgrade, 
downgrade and possible downgrade are examined. On the aggregated level, all announcement 
types show a significant impact on the spread at the actual event day, while only negative 
announcements show significant anticipation. Combining the before and after crisis period as 
the stable period, all event types except for downgrades show significance at the event day 
and no announcements display significant anticipation. During the crisis negative 
announcements show significant magnified anticipation and total reaction, while positive 
events lose its impact and significance. Lastly, after the crisis, Moody’s rating 
announcements, both pooled positive and pooled negative, lose some of its impact magnitude 
compared to before the crisis. In sum, our findings propose that the impact of rating 
announcements depend on the underlying market conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit risk is a financial risk present at the global credit market and concerned with the debt 
holder’s capacity to meet its financial obligations. This risk is continuously monitored by 
market participants, such as hedge funds, banks and insurance companies and is primarily 
used for asset pricing, portfolio and risk management purposes. The latter can be managed 
with a Credit Default Swap (CDS), an insurance like credit derivative. The CDS market 
emerged in the 1990s and has during the last decade become the most dominant credit trading 
instrument. Particularly, the CDS markets outstanding notional amount rapidly grew from 
$13.9 to $58.2 trillion between 2005 and the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 
(ISDA, 2013). One of the significant reasons for its popularity is the fact that the CDS allows 
investors to speculate and take positions purely on credit and the risk associated with it.  
Similarly as an insurance contract, the CDS allows a party to transfer credit risk. Specifically, 
in order for the protection seller to be willing to keep the credit risk, a premium has to be paid 
annually by the counterparty, namely the CDS spread. As the spread is the compensation 
demanded of a part to bear this risk, the spread is a reliable measure of credit risk.  
Officially, credit risk is measured by credit rating agencies, such as Moody´s and Standard & 
Poor´s, whose main duty is to increase the transparency and thereby fulfill an important 
function in order for the financial system to operate efficiently. In particular, such agencies 
assign a letter grade denoting the creditworthiness of the obligor. These grades rely upon 
public as well as non-public information that are further communicated to the market by credit 
rating announcements. 
Since rating announcements contain information regarding credit risk, one would expect 
market participants to incorporate this new information into the CDS spread as it also is a 
measure of credit risk. This relationship and the informational content of rating 
announcements have been studied by numerous papers (Hull et al. 2004; Norden and Weber 
2004; Micu et al. 2004; Micu et al 2006; Ismailescu and Kazemi 2010; Galil and Soffer 2011; 
Finnerty et al 2013). 
By observing previous research, we find that this relationship has simply not been studied 
with regard to market conditions, as further discussed in Section 1.1 Overview of related 
studies and hypothesis motivation. Explicitly, periods in global recession and the relative 
stable periods have not been investigated in separation. This is due to the relatively young 
research area in combination with the fact that parts of the “Dot-com crisis” of 2001-2002 and 
2 
 
the “Sub-prime crisis” of 2008-2009 often have been included in the samples without being 
specifically considered in the analysis.  
 
During the Sub-prime crisis of 2008-2009, the demand for CDS contracts heavily increased. 
Additionally, the spread was substantially magnified and the number of negative rating 
announcements increased substantially due to the changed market conditions.  Considering 
the new financial environment, one could speculate whether the relationship between CDS 
spreads and rating announcements changed for this period. If such results would be found, 
this would be favorable for market participants to be aware of. Therefore, the research and 
monitoring of this relationship during periods of financial distress is of great interest. The 
same arguments motivates the research for the stable periods before and after the crisis.  
 
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the effect of credit rating announcements on CDS 
spreads during different market conditions. Specifically, we investigate if CDS spreads react 
differently to credit announcements during periods of global financial distress than under 
relative financial stability. We apply an event study to analyze the three time periods: (1) prior 
to the global Sub-prime crisis of 2008-2009, (2) during the crisis and (3) after the crisis. In 
addition, the total period as well as the combined periods before and after the crisis will be 
analyzed. The latter will be called “the stable period”. The study covers a period between 
November 26, 2004 to November 13, 2014 and the final sample consists of 120 entities from 
the CDX North America Investment Grade (CDX NA IG) corresponding to 300 679 CDS 
spread quotes as well as 370 rating announcements from Moody’s.  
 
The remainder of this essay is composed as follows. Section 1.1 provides more detailed 
research findings within this field as well as a motivation for our hypotheses. Section 2 
outlines the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents our data set and final sample. Section 
4 explains the event study methodology that was applied as well as some discussion and 
critique regarding the methodology. Section 5 presents our results and discussion as well as 
the significance tests, and lastly, Section 6 outlines some concluding remarks and proposal to 
future research.   
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1.1 Overview of related studies and hypothesis motivation 
There is an extensive amount of literature investigating the informational content of credit 
rating announcements. Most recent research has applied the standard event study 
methodology, where the concept is to investigate how CDS spreads react to credit rating 
announcements. Under the assumption of market efficiency, if an event contains new 
information to the market, abnormal spread changes should be observed at such events. In 
addition, market efficiency is tested by investigating the spread changes at periods before as 
well as after the actual event. Empirical research has investigated informational content by 
price changes on stock markets, bond markets and more recently, on the relatively new CDS 
market (CDS spreads). Numerous papers have investigated the CDS market, where Hull et al. 
(2004) was one of the earliest prominent papers.  
 
Goh and Ederington (1993) point out that the potential reaction of rating events on stock prices 
depends on the underlying reason of the event, which is not the case for the CDS market in 
the same extent. For instance, a positive event will theoretically always have a negative 
direction of impact on the spread. Considering the stock market the same positive event will 
impact the spread in a direction depending on the reasons of the announcement, such as the 
change in the financial outlook or leverage. Hence, it is easier to investigate the CDS market 
because the underlying reason of the event does not have to be considered. (Micu et. al 2006) 
Additionally, Norden and Weber (2004) find that the CDS market is more efficient than the 
stock market, thereby suggesting that it is more accurate when investigating the informational 
content of rating announcements. 
 
Regarding the relationship between the bond yield and the CDS spreads, Hull et. al (2004) 
explain the theoretical relationship and point out that the CDS spread is preferred to the bond 
market when investigating the informational content of credit ratings announcements. This is 
due to the fact that bond yields depend on both the risk free interest rate as well as credit risk, 
whereas the CDS spreads do not depend on the risk free interest rate. (Hull et. al (2004) 
 
Because of these arguments mentioned above, the informational content of the credit rating 
announcements is investigated through the CDS market in this study. In Table 1 we shortly 
outline the summary of some significant previous results regarding the impact of credit rating 
announcements on CDS spreads.  
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Table 1
Literature overview. Recent research conserning the informational content of rating announcements on the CDS market. 
Study, Data and Entities Main Results
Hull et al. (2004)
• 1998-2002, Moody's, Anticipation for all  negative events.
• rating changes, reviews, outlooks, At the actual event day, only reviews for downgrade
• 59 positive events and 266 negative events, showed a significant impact.
• adjusted CDS spread changes during [-90, 10] (no conclusions for positive events due to small positive sample)
Entities:  Corporations, sovereigns 
Norden and Weber (2004)
• 2000-2002, Moddy's, S&P and Fitch, Anticipation for all  negative events,  stronger for negative
• 231 rating changes and 116 watch listings, reviews. At the announcement day, all  negative events show 
• adjusted CDS spread changes at [-90, 90] significance.
Entities:  Corporations (no conclusions for positive events due to small positive sample)
Micu et al. (2004)
• 2001-2003, Moody's and S&P, Negative events contain valuable information,
• rating changes, reviews, outlooks, where negative outlooks show least significance
• 325 positive events,  2010 negative events Positive event were not significant.
• adjusted CDS spread changes at [-60, 20]
Entities:  Corporations
Micu et al. (2006)
• 2001-2005,  Moddy's, S&P and Fitch,  Regarding percent spread changes: All  types of rating 
• rating changes, reviews and outlooks, announcements - whether positive or negative, show significant
• 504 positive events, 1510 negative events impact at event day, and only negative events are anticipated
• adjusted CDS spread changes and Regarding absolute spread changes:
   adjusted CDS spread percentage changes only negative reviews display significance.
Entities:  Corporations
Ismailescu and Kazemi  (2010)
• 2001-2009, S&P, Positive rating announcements have an immediate impact on 
• rating changes, reviews, outlook, sovereign CDS spreads, while negative events show no impact.
• adjusted CDS spread changes at [-60, 20] Strong anticipation is founds for negative events. 
   adjusted CDS spread percentage changes
Entities:  Sovereigns (emerging markets)
Galil and Soffer (2011)
• 2002-2006, Moody's, S&P, Significant abnormal change for all  rating events is found on 
• rating changes, reviews, the announcement day. Negative events show larger impact on
• 1000 positive and 1866 negative events, CDS spreads and are more anticipated than positive events.
• adjusted CDS spread changes for [-90, 90]
Entities: Corporations and sovereigns
Finnerty et al. (2013)
• 2001-2008, S&P, At announcement, all  positive events show significance, while
• rating changes, reviews, outlook, regarding negative events only reviews were significant,
• 1017 positive events, 3114 negativ events Negative events were stronger anticipated then positive.
• adjusted CDS spread changes for [-90, 90]
Entities:  Corporations
   more positive events than previous research During recession, spread changes were magnified for upgrades
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In general, consistent with theory, the studies show that the spread decreases for positive 
rating announcements (review for possible upgrades and upgrades) while the spread for 
negative events (review for possible downgrades and downgrades) increases. Further in line 
with each other, negative events are typically better anticipated and show a stronger total 
impact on spreads than positive events. This asymmetry has been motivated with the argument 
that media highlights negative news more than positive news and as a consequence negative 
events show stronger anticipation than positive events. Specifically, possible downgrades 
have been consistently significant and show a stronger impact than the other announcement 
types. Regarding positive events, the results are relatively mixed. Earlier studies within this 
field, such as Hull et al. (2004), Norden and Weber (2004) and Micu et al. (2004) find that 
positive events do not convey any significant information, while on the other hand, later 
studies find contradicting results that positive information is significant. Similar disagreement 
is found for downgrades as Norden and Weber (2004), Micu el al. (2004), Micu et al. (2006), 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) as well as Galil and Soffer (2011) find downgrades to reveal 
significant information while Hull et al. (2004) and Finnerty et al. (2013), do not. 
It should be noted that the data set of these studies all cover periods with varying market 
conditions. Thus, some years in recession are covered, but never as an entire crisis period by 
its own nor an entire stable period characterized as a period with absence of global recession. 
This is due to the fact that the research is fairly young while the Dot-com crisis 2001-2002 
and the Subprime crisis 2008-2009 has interfered with the results. Figure 1 clarifies this by 
illustrating the data sets used in related studies as well as the data set used in this study. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Data set analysis. Illustrates the data sets from the overviewed research and this study of 2015 in relation 
to the "Dot-com crisis" and the "Sub-prime crisis ".  
 
Moreover, the latest recognized results in this field of research were presented by Finnerty et 
al. (2013) whose data set only covers until the beginning of  2009, including the crisis 2001-
2003 as well as the early beginning of the financial crisis 2008-2009. Further, Finnerty et al. 
(2013) are the only ones to our knowledge taking periods of financial distress into slight 
consideration in their analysis. Therefore, the research covering the financial crisis of 2008-
2009 and its aftermath is limited.  
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This study contributes to the informational content research by observing the relationship 
between CDS spreads and credit rating announcements in consideration of different market 
conditions in the analysis. For this matter, we propose hypotheses in line with previous 
research that further are tested for the periods before, during and after the crisis as well as for 
the stable period aggregating the before and after periods.  
H0  (the announcement type does not contain new information): 
This is the null hypothesis for each of the following alternative hypotheses for the 
different announcement types.  
H1  (Upgrades/Downgrades contain new valuable information to the market):  
This hypothesis will be confirmed if a significant abnormal spread reaction is found 
for actual rating changes within the event window. To be clear, upgrades and 
downgrades are tested separately. Formally, H0 is rejected and H1 is not rejected if 
cumulative average abnormal returns for any of the window parts [-20,-2], [-1,1], 
[2,20] are significantly different from zero.  
H2  (Possible upgrades/Possible downgrades contain new information):  
This hypothesis will be confirmed if a significant abnormal spread reaction is found 
for rating reviews within the event window. Precisely, possible upgrades and 
possible downgrades are tested separately. Formally, H0 is rejected and H1 is not 
rejected if cumulative average abnormal returns for any of the window parts               
[-20,-2], [-1,1], [2,20] are significantly different from zero.   
H3  (Positive events contain new information):  
Confirmed if a significant abnormal spread reaction is found in connection to the 
pooled positive event.  Possible upgrades and upgrades are combined. Formally, H0 
is rejected and H1 is not rejected if cumulative average abnormal returns for any of 
the window parts [-20,-2], [-1,1], [2,20] are significantly different from zero.   
H4  (Negative events contain new information):  
Confirmed if a significant abnormal spread reaction is found in connection to the 
pooled negative event. Precisely, possible downgrades and downgrades are 
aggregated. Formally, H0 is rejected and H1 is not rejected if cumulative average 
abnormal returns for any of the window parts [-20,-2], [-1,1], [2,20] are significantly 
different from zero.   
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1.2 Delimitations 
This paper will only examine investment grade corporations in North America included in the 
CDX NA IG. Hence, all CDS contracts have corporations as their underlying asset. Only 
quotes from CDS contracts denoted in USD currency are included. This paper investigates 
the sample period between November 26, 2004 to November 13, 2014, and as a result the 
only crisis period that will be analyzed is the financial crisis of 2008-2009.  
This study only considers credit rating announcements by Moody’s. Therefore, the 
informational content of only this agency will be investigated and hence the contamination 
effects from other agencies will not be investigated, simply due to timing constraints. Since 
Moody´s is one of the most prominent credit rating agencies covering all the North American 
corporations included in the CDX NA IG, it is sufficient for this study. Moody’s have seven 
types of rating announcements: downgrade, upgrade, possible downgrades, possible upgrade, 
stable outlook, negative outlook and positive outlook. In this study outlooks will be excluded 
as earlier studies have mainly focused on reviews and actual rating changes as outlooks.  
 
  
8 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In this section, the main concepts regarding credit rating agencies, the credit default swap as 
well as the efficiency market hypothesis are outlined. 
2.1 Credit rating agencies  
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been operating since the beginning of the last century. 
They emerged when the demand increased for specialized firms to assess the credit risk on 
issuer’s debt instruments. At the time banks were primarily evaluating the credit quality, but 
their internal procedures were often lacking. (Crouhy, Galai & Mark, 2000)  
The agency´s main duty is to mitigate the information asymmetry and thereby increasing the 
efficiency of the credit markets. This is achieved by the fact that the ratings are based on all 
information known to the CRAs, including publicly and non-public available information 
provided by the issuer. (Moody’s, 2014-12-20) In fact, the agencies are exempt from fair 
disclosure laws, such as Regulation FD, and thereby entitled to access information not 
available to the rest of the market when formulating the ratings. (Saunders & Allen, 2010)  
Today there are three global market leaders within the credit rating field; Moody’s, Standard 
& Poor’s Rating Services (S&P) and Fitch Ratings. Together they control about 95% of the 
global credit ratings market (de Haan & Amtenbrink, 2011).  
2.1.1 Credit rating and rating scale 
A credit rating does not address an investment recommendation for a given security. In the 
words of S&P (2014-12-20 a), ratings, “express relative opinions about the creditworthiness 
of an issuer or credit quality of an individual debt issue, from strongest to weakest, within a 
universe of credit risk.” Since the ratings are merely relative opinions, not facts, they can 
neither be stated as accurate nor inaccurate. (Standard & Poor´s, 2014-12-20 a) Further, in the 
words of Fitch Ratings (2014-12-20), “ratings are inherently forward-looking and embody 
assumptions and predictions about future events that by their nature cannot be verified as 
facts.” Therefore, ratings are not an exact measure of credit risk and can be affected by future 
events that cannot be foreseen. Thus, these opinions are considered in a long term perspective 
but are not static. (Fitch Ratings, 2014-12-20) 
When an agency in the future changes its opinion, this is represented by a so called rating 
announcement or simply, a rating event.1 Primarily, it consists of actual rating changes2, rating 
reviews or outlooks. Outlooks are opinions about a ratings medium-term trend and 
represented mainly by positive, negative and stable announcements, where the stable outlook 
                                                          
1 In this paper we will use the terms “rating event” and “rating announcement” interchangeably. 
2 In this paper we will use the announcement terms “rating change” and “actual rating change” interchangeably.  
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indicated that the rating probably will remain unchanged. Further, a rating is monitored 
continuously and analyzed when new information is available. If there is a reason for the CRA 
to believe that the analysis is likely to result in a rating change in the near future, a 
“watchlist/review” designation by Moody´s will be communicated in order to notify the 
market. A “possible upgrade (possible downgrade)” review indicates that a rating upgrade 
(downgrade) is distinctly possible. Reviews are more accurate indicators of future outcome 
than outlooks as these focus on the short term. However, CRAs can change a rating without 
a preceding review announcement. (Moody´s, 2015-03-12) 
Ratings on long-term obligations are denominated as letter grades on an ordinal rating scale3.  
The grades are roughly divided into two categories depending on the issuer’s level of default 
risk. Ratings above Ba1 are referred as “investment grade” and the remaining grades are 
referred as “speculative grade debt” or “junk bonds” as the latter is associated with 
considerably higher risk.  (Moody´s, 2015-03-12) 
2.1.2 Credit rating process and methodology  
A credit rating process is illustrated in Figure 2. In order for the credit rating process to be 
initiated, a debt issuer has to deliver a formal request. Further, the credit rating agency 
designate a responsible team of analysts to assess current relevant information provided by 
the issuer, so called “Pre-evaluation”. Afterwards, the analysts have an appointment with the 
management group of the entity reviewing and discussing the confidential information in 
order to get a clear picture of the current state. Following the meeting, a rating proposal is 
presented and reviewed by a rating committee specialized in the relevant sector or industry, 
which then votes on the proposal. A pre-publication including a conclusion and voting results 
are then communicated to the debt issuer who is entitled to examine the accuracy and 
reliability. The debt holder can further appeal the rating if new adequate information can be 
provided to support the case. Otherwise, the remaining step is to decide whether the rating 
should remain confidential or go public. (Moody´s, 2015-03-25) 
 
                                                          
3 For a full credit rating scale illustration see Appendix 1. 
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Fig. 2. Credit Rating Process                        Source: Moody´s and Standard & Poor´s, 2014-12-20 
Communicated ratings to the public are published on the agencies´ websites and onwards 
continuously monitored in order to remain trustworthy to the credit market. If there is a reason 
for a credit rating agency to believe that new information is likely to result in a rating change, 
the “watchlist” warning will be communicated. The time frame for the whole rating process, 
from a request to issuer rating, differs from one to another but usually takes a couple of weeks. 
(Moody´s, 2015-03-25) 
As shown by Cantor et al (1995), rating agencies´ opinions about the credit quality of the 
same entity often differ from each other. Since the evaluation methods used by the agencies 
are similar, but not exactly the same, this can give rise to different credit ratings. (Crouhy, 
Galai & Mark, 2000) 
2.1.3 Credit rating agencies´ value creation through rating issues 
Since CRAs are regarded as experts and unbiased evaluators of credit risk, their ratings are 
widely accepted by market participants and regulatory bodies.  (Crouhy, Galai & Mark, 2000) 
Investors consider ratings as a crucial factor when pricing securities, but also when 
benchmarking different investment alternatives. There are three main values created to issuers 
by credit ratings together with the fact that investors depend on these ratings. Firstly, the 
issuer’s offerings become attractive to a broader range of buyers as many institutions are 
prevented by regulation or charter to invest in non-investment grade debt issues. As expressed 
by Moody´s (2014-12-20), “A rating is effectively a credit passport that provide access to 
both domestic and international pools of debt capital”. Further, this leads to reduced funding 
costs for the issuers and enables larger sales with longer maturities. Thirdly, the opinions 
expressed by the CRAs contribute to stabilize the market by supporting investors to keep their 
composure. This is evident during periods when the market is more volatile. Bad news for 
instance, could affect the price of a company’s stock or outstanding bond even though it does 
not affect the firm’s long term credit quality. (Moody´s, 2014-12-20) 
Surveillance Publication Pre-Publication 
Rating 
Committee 
Formal Request 
 
Pre-Evaluation 
Management 
Meeting 
 
Analysis 
Appeal 
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2.1.4 A brief discussion – Criticism of the credit rating agencies 
Following the financial crisis of 2008-2009 the credit rating agencies were criticized for not 
living up to their expectations. The criticism was based on the fact that the CRAs assigned 
too optimistic ratings on mortgage backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) products4 in the US credit market. In late 2006, when mortgage loans 
began to default, Moody’s and S&P started downgrading CDOs and MBSes. During the next 
two years the pair realized mass downgrades of these financial products. Specifically, 
approximately 90% of the top-rated securities created back in 2006-2007 were 
downgraded to a speculative status, thereby disrupting the market environment. (Levin & 
Coburn, 2011) Further, since the business model roughly builds upon the fact that the debt 
issuer pays the CRA in order to be assigned a rating, there is a financial incentive to act in the 
“customers” interest rather than the investors in theory. Therefore, there might be a reason to 
criticize the independence of CRAs. (Saunders & Allen, 2010) However, Micu et al. (2006) 
discuss that this incentive could be offset by the fact that the CRAs reputation is put at stake 
by realizing such action. In addition, Stolper (2009) shows that the existing approval scheme 
by regulators, such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), could pressure the CRAs 
to assign correct ratings in theory but further clarifies that this is not as simple in reality. 
2.2 Credit default swaps  
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a popular over-the-counter (OTC) credit derivative. It is a 
formal agreement between two parties, usually between institutional investors and dealers 
such as investment banks, in order to transfer credit risk.  It can be considered as an insurance 
contract except for the fact that there is no requirement to own the underlying debt in order to 
enter a CDS contract. In other words, the trading of CDS contracts is not limited by 
outstanding debt. (Saunders & Allen, 2010) 
In a pure CDS, the party selling the credit risk (protection buyer) is contracted to annually pay 
the counterparty a fixed amount corresponding to a negotiated number of basis points (CDS 
spread) times the face value of the underlying debt (CDS notional principal).5 These payments 
are characterized as periodic cash payments and are paid until maturity in exchange for a full 
 
                                                          
4 Simply put, a large baskets of mortgage backed securities (MBSes). 
5 Hence, if the CDS spread is 200 basis points (bps) and the CDS notional principal is 10 million USD, the annual 
premium paid by the protection buyer is 200´000 USD. 
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compensation at settlement in case of a Credit Event.6 Figure 3 illustrates the cash flow for a 
CDS contract in absence of a credit event. (Markit, 2014-11-03) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Cash-flow from initiation of trade to maturity with the absence of a credit event.   Source: Markit, 2014-11-03 
Every specific contract builds up on a Reference Entity7 and a Reference Obligation. The 
former represents the underlying entity which the insurance is issued upon, simply the capital 
borrower, whereas the latter is the type of debt being insured.8 Further, the CDS contract does 
not need to have the same maturity as the underlying debt. (Markit, 2014-11-03) 
In case of a credit event, the CDS settlement can both be executed in terms of a physical or 
cash transaction. If the reference obligation is a corporate bond, a physical settlement requires 
the insurance buyer to deliver a recover value of the defaulted asset.9 Additionally, the accrued 
periodic payment for the present period has to be paid in order to receive a full compensation. 
The following cash-flows in Figure 4 illustrates the physical settlement of the CDS contract. 
(Markit, 2014-11-03)  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cash-flow in case of a credit event.    Source: Markit, 2014-11-03  
                                                          
6 A credit event triggers a settlement of the Credit Default Swap and is classified as one or more of the following six 
conditions: bankruptcy, payment default, debt restructuring, obligation default, obligation acceleration and 
repudiation/moratorium. It is worth noting that the three latter are less common events. In this paper we use the terms 
“default” and “credit event” interchangeably. 
7 Primarily, the reference entity of a CDS may be a corporation such as Transocean Inc., a sovereign such as Greece, or 
a quasi-sovereign such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
8 Specifically, the reference obligation denotes the minimum debt seniority accepted to be delivered to the protection 
seller during a settlement if the reference entity defaults as there is no requirement to own the underlying debt in order to 
enter a CDS contract. Thereby, a similar contract is accepted at settlement. 
9 Specifically, a physical bond with the corresponding seniority of the reference obligation in order to define the face 
value that the recovery value is derived from. At delivery the insured party thereby has the option to deliver the cheapest 
bond available with the acceptable seniority. 
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In case of default, the settlement process is handled by a Credit Auction Event10 and further 
the cash settlement is the standard transaction in the CDS market today. It is very similar to 
the physical settlement except for the fact that only a net cash amount is paid to the protection 
buyer corresponding to the face value subtracted with the recover value set at the auction as 
well as the accrued periodic payment. However, the settlement amount can also be 
predetermined in the contract. (Daniels & Jensen, 2005) 
By design, the credit default spread is negatively correlated with the creditworthiness of the 
reference entity. If the creditworthiness for an entity deteriorates the spread will widen while 
if the creditworthiness improves the spread will tighten. The spread increases at negative 
events simply as the market requires a higher compensation to the new announced larger 
default risk. The opposite analogy yields for positive events. (Hull et al, 2004) Further, as 
explained by Daniels and Jensen (2005), the CDS spread theoretically is the yield subtracted 
by the risk-free rate. Specifically, it is clarified that if one takes a position in a coupon-bond 
and meanwhile adding a CDS insurance on the same reference entity, this should be 
equivalent to a position in a risk-free coupon bond. This implies that the CDS spread should 
be close to the credit spread over the risk-free rate. (Daniels & Jensen, 2005) Hull et al. (2004), 
found this relationship to hold fairly well empirically.  
The CDS market emerged in the 1990s and quickly became a popular market for hedging or 
investing purposes. Specifically, it enables investors or businesses, such as banks, with credit 
exposure to transfer credit risk. Thereby, freeing up capital as the investor does not have to 
set aside an amount in case of an obligor´s default. Further, the contract allows investors to 
speculate and take positions merely on credit and the credit risk associated with it. As the 
credit derivative has many benefits, the CDS has become the most dominant credit trading 
instrument as well as the main indicator of the credit quality of an entity. (Markit, 2014-11-
03) 
Debt Restructuring, one of the CDS credit events, is characterized as any delay or reduction 
in the notional amount or the interest paid. It is not easy to define at all times as it often may 
be characterized as a “soft” credit event where the loss of an investor is not exactly 
identifiable. In this case, opportunistic investors can take advantage of the possibility to 
                                                          
10 As the CDS notional outstanding in the market became far larger than the debt outstanding last decade, the physical 
settlement was no longer an adequate method to use. The problem occurring was that when an extensive number of 
investors following a default struggled to find a debt instrument matching the reference entity, resulting in a trading 
activity increasing bond prices and thereby the anticipated recovery value. Therefore, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) in 2005 formalized a so called Credit Event Auction to handle the settlement process. 
By this auction, in a transparent way, a poll of dealers decide a market-wide fair value for the defaulted debt which further 
is used to settle in cash. However, investors owning the actual underlying debt can net their positions through a physical 
settlement.  
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deliver the cheapest bond at settlement to profit despite no significant change in the reference 
entities creditworthiness. For this reason, ISDA has progressively introduced different 
restructuring clauses, so called “Doc clauses”, to CDS contracts in order to define the degree 
of protection at debt restructuring, also characterizing one of the main differences between 
traded contracts. (Packer & Zhu, 2005) 
Specifically, four restructuring types were introduced: full restructuring (CR), modified 
restructuring (MR), modified-modified restructuring (MM) and no restructuring (XR). The 
former denotes that every possible restructure event classifies as a credit event, also any bond 
with a maturity up to 30 years is accepted to deliver. The MR clause was introduced with the 
aim to further limit the debt acceptable to have a maximum maturity of 30 months following 
the end of the CDS. Soon, the MM clause was introduced to nuance the maturity limitation to 
60 months for restructured debt and 30 months for all the rest of the debt. The remaining type 
denotes that restructuring is not defined as a CDS credit event, thereby offset any 
opportunistic behavior. (Packer & Zhu, 2005) 
Credit default swap contracts can be specified as single-name as well as multi-name contracts, 
primarily CDS indices, relating to the number of underlying reference entities. The market 
for single-name contracts has generally had a larger market share than the multi-name 
contracts. This ratio evened out during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. (Bank of 
International Settlements, 2015-03-20) 
A CDS index is similar to a single-name CDS mainly apart from the facts that the CDS spread 
is an average of the different contracts included. The two main index families in the market 
are the CDX and iTraxx indicies of which the CDX North America Investment Grade (CDX 
NA IG) and the iTraxx Europe are the most central indicies. These, do each consist of a basket 
of the 125 most liquid contracts, equally weighted, that are updated semi-annually in order to 
maintain high level of liquidity and credit quality. Further, the indices include the five 
following sectors: industrials, consumers, energy, TMT (telecommunication, media & 
technology) and financials.11 (Markit, 2015-03-23) 
2.3 A brief discussion – Credit rating vs. CDS spread    
The credit quality is an unobservable characteristic of a corporation. The CDS spread and the 
credit rating of a corporation are both driven by this attribute. CDS spreads generally change 
continuously since the most liquid contracts are traded daily. In contrast, credit ratings change 
discretely. As pointed out by Hull et al. (2004) the credit rating should be expected to lag the 
CDS spread changes with the assumption that they are driven by the same available 
                                                          
11 The iTraxx further also includes the sector ”autos”. 
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information. However, as emphasized by Cantor and Mann (2003), credit rating agencies have 
stability as one of their targets, and therefore are keen to avoid a situation where a recent 
published actual rating change has to be revised. Therefore, this stability objective probably 
will result in actual rating changes lagging changes in the CDS spread. Despite this fact, credit 
rating agencies derive their opinions from several different sources of information including 
non-publicly accessible ones (Saunders & Allen, 2010). Under the assumption that the 
agencies are the only institutions or market participants having access to private information, 
there is a theoretical possibility of discrete rating changes leading continuous CDS spreads. 
Hence, this possibility cannot be excluded to occur in reality. 
2.4 The efficient market hypothesis  
The efficient market hypothesis states that all relevant information is fully incorporated in a 
security’s market price at any time. This is a result of an efficient market that takes all relevant 
information into account at evaluation of a security. Further, the hypothesis comes in three 
degrees of efficiency; weak, semi-strong and strong efficiency. (Fama, 1970) 
Weak efficiency states that all past information is incorporated in the security price. This 
implies that historical data or old news is not sufficient to forecast any future abnormal 
returns and that only recent news or insider information would be appropriate. (Zvi, Kane & 
Marcus, 2013) 
Semi-strong efficiency is the next stage of efficiency as it incorporates past information as 
well as new information into the security price, and as a consequence only insider 
information is useful for the prediction of future abnormal returns. This implies that the 
price will quickly be incorporated directly following new information announcements that 
are relevant for the security. (Zvi, Kane & Marcus, 2013) 
Strong efficiency is the strongest degree of efficiency and neither past, new nor insider 
information can be utilized for the prediction of the abnormal price performance. (Zvi, Kane 
& Marcus, 2013) 
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3. The data set and final sample 
In this section the data set will be presented followed by a brief explanation of the approach 
used in order to receive a final sample. Additional descriptive statistics for the final sample 
is provided in Appendix 3.  
3.1 The data set  
The data set used in this paper consists of both daily CDS spreads and credit rating 
announcements for the 125 companies included in the CDX North America Investment Grade 
index (CDX NA IG) as of 22nd September 201412. This index was obtained from Markit, a 
London-based provider covering the OTC derivative markets. The CDX NA IG was chosen 
in order to ensure that the sample contained the most liquid reference entities from the 
American market. Even though the crisis of 2008-2009 was a global crisis, the North 
American market was chosen as the crisis emerged from the US mortgage credit market and 
thereby is highly relevant for this study. 
Credit rating announcements were obtained from Moody’s, specifically four types of events 
were collected; upgrades, downgrades, possible upgrades and possible downgrades. 
Specifically, we gathered ratings for long term senior unsecured debt denominated in USD.13 
Senior unsecured debt rating was chosen as it reflects the issuer rating by definition as stressed 
by Hull et al. (2004) as well as it is the most used rating regarding prior research to our 
knowledge. A total of 419 rating events were obtained.  
The CDS spread data was provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream covering the period from 
November 26, 2004 to November 13, 2014.14 In total 313 532 spread mid-quotes for senior 
CDS contracts denoted in USD were gathered. More specifically contracts with a 5-year 
maturity with a MR clause were chosen. The mid-quote represents the midpoint price between 
the daily bid and ask quotes. 
Further, in order to be consistent, CDS contracts exclusively with a MR clause are included, 
since there was a negligible difference in the quotes between contracts with different 
restructuring clauses. Only contracts with the maturity of five years are included because they 
are the most liquid and due to the fact that this is the benchmark maturity in the CDS market.  
                                                          
12 Specifically, CDX NA IG Series 23 Version 1 was chosen. 
13 The seniority of a bond relates to the priority of repayment from the reference entities post-default recovery value. A 
senior bond has to be repaid a head of a subordinated (junior) bond. A debt being secured refers to a bond that is 
collateralized with an asset owned by the reference entity and an investors pledge in case of a default. Thereby, an investor 
holding an unsecured bond does not have any contractual rights to the assets and therefore is fully dependent on the credit 
quality of the reference entity. 
14 Two sources within the Thomson Reuters Datastream software were merged in order to receive a sample for the entire 
decade: Credit Market Analysis Ltd. (a McGrawHill company) from 2004 to 2007 and Thomson Reuters from 2007 to 
2014.  
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3.2 Final sample  
In order to compile a final sample we proceeded with the following approach. Firstly, we 
excluded the five outliers whose spread stood out from the rest of the sample in order to ensure 
that the sample would be representative15. The corporations were not representative for one 
of the two reasons: (1) the spreads were substantially wider than the remaining 120 firms16, 
(2) their spreads where not following a stochastic process at all, as they instead were following 
straight horizontal lines for long time periods.  
Secondly, we clear the sample for clustering of event windows in order to avoid contamination 
to affect the results. More specifically, overlapping event windows within the same security 
were processed with the following set of rules similar to Hull et al. (2004): (1) if two event 
windows overlapped with 20 days or less, only the later event was excluded, while (2) if the 
overlap was 21 days or more, both the events were excluded.  
Lastly, all the remaining 120 companies and their corresponding spreads were included in our 
final sample. Even though they did not always have any rating events throughout the period, 
they still contributed to explaining the normal market behavior.  
Our final sample consists of 120 reference entities corresponding to 300 679 individual daily 
spread mid-quotes and a total of 370 rating events.17 The reference entities represent five 
sectors: consumer goods, energy, financials, industrials and telecommunications18. The most 
common sector in number of events included in the sample is consumer goods with 145 of 
the total 370 events, while the remaining sectors are similarly frequent. Table 2 presents a 
summary of the event distribution with respect to sector.  
  
                                                          
15 Particularly, American International Group Inc., Ford Motor Company, Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., Genworth 
Holdings Inc.  as well as General Electric Capital Corp. were excluded. 
16 As for an example Ford M. Company had a spread of 14000 compared to the average 88, max 1350 and min 1,5 for 
the remaining 120 firms.  
17 See Appendix 2 for a complete list of the final sample including the removed entities and their corresponding CDS quotes 
and rating events. 
18 Specifically, telecommunications, media and technology.  
Table 2
Nr. of rating events included by sector and period.
Before Crisis After Total period
Consumer goods 54 31 60 145
Energy 24 11 21 56
Financials  20 17 12 49
Industrials 22 8 22 52
Telecommunications 26 13 29 68
Total nr. of events 146 80 144 370
18 
 
Further, as illustrated in Table 3 a number of 146 events were included before the crisis, 80 
during the crisis and 144 after the crisis period.  
 
As the crisis period is the shortest of the three periods, this distribution is a natural 
consequence. Further, there are clearly fewer positive than negative announcements during 
the crisis period with 17 of 80 events, while this ratio during the stable periods is almost one 
to one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3
Nr. of rating events by announcement type and sample period.
Before Crisis After Total period
Upgrades 37 12 52 101
Possible Upgrades 36 5 18 59
Downgrades 29 35 27 91
Possible Downgrades 44 28 47 119
Total nr. of events 146 80 144 370
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 Event window  
[-20, -2] [-1, 1] [2, 20] 
t = -20 
Event day  
t = 20 t = 0 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Applied Methodology – Event study 
The event study methodology was primarily developed as a method to investigate the effect 
of economic events on stock prices. However, due to its general applicability and simplicity 
the methodology has become a well-used methodology within finance and especially within 
financial accounting (MacKinlay, 1997). With some modifications we follow MacKinlay 
(1997) who outlines the typical structure of an event study methodology. 19 
Firstly, we identify the period of investigation of the CDS spreads in connection to an event, 
also called the event window, as 20 days prior to the event, the event day and 20 days after 
the event, making the event window 41 days in total as illustrated in Figure 5. Further, to test 
our hypotheses, the window parts [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] are tested for significant abnormal 
spread reactions. It should be mentioned that there is no official rule regarding the length of 
an event window except for critique of statistical kind that will be discussed in Section 4.2 
Methodology assumptions and discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Event window including the sections [-20, -2], [-1, 1] and [2, 20] that are tested for significant abnormal 
spread reactions (cumulative average abnormal returns).  
 
Secondly, as the event study methodology was primarily developed to measure the 
significance of an event by observing stock price performance, it was natural to measure the 
impact in the context of returns. As CDS spreads are not actual price levels or returns but 
rather a price denoted as a percentage20 of the notional amount, a proxy for returns has to be 
found. The overviewed research deals with this in two ways. One ways is simply to regard 
the spread level as a usual price level, and thereby use the percentage spread changes as a 
proxy for returns. The alternative way is to use absolute spread changes as a proxy. Both 
methods show similar popularity. In this study, the spread percentage change will be used as 
it measures the spread change relative to the spread level. This is especially important in this 
study as the crisis of 2008-2009 is investigated and for this period the spread levels and 
                                                          
19 The applied methodology in this study was practically performed using the Python coding language. 
20 The CDS spread is denoted in basis points (bps), 1/100 of a percent. 
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thereby absolute spread changes strongly differ across securities and periods. Thus, to be able 
to compare a period of recession to stable periods and also not to risk that individual entities 
with magnified spreads will have a larger importance for the results than firms with smaller 
spreads, the spread levels have to be neutralized with its magnitude. Thereby percentage 
spread changes will be a proxy for returns in this study as seen in Equation 1, where the return 
𝑹𝒊,𝒕 on day 𝒕 for entity 𝒊 is calculated, similar to Micu et al. (2004) and Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010).  
                                      𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
                                          (1) 
Further, to determine whether there are any abnormal CDS spread changes caused by the 
event, abnormal returns (ARs) have to be calculated. Ideally, ARs are calculated as observed 
returns subtracted by normal returns, where a normal return refers to the expected return in 
absence of the event. However, normal performance is most likely impossible to determine in 
reality and thereby an appropriate proxy has to be found.  
To simulate daily normal performance in this study, similarly as Micu et al. (2004)21, four 
different indices are constructed, one for each rating category. The indices are created as 
follows: At a given day, the index corresponds to the median spread on that day, in particularly 
the median spread of the entities that on that day have a rating that belongs to the index. The 
following entity ratings belong to the corresponding indices: 
AAA/AA index – containing the ratings AAA, AA+, AA, AA- 
A index – containing the ratings A+, A, A- 
Baa index – containing the ratings Baa+, Baa, Baa- 
NIG index – containing all ratings lower than Baa-, also called non-investment grade (NIG)                         
…                ratings 
To give the reader a feeling for the indices created, Figure 6 shows the four indices for the 
entire period calculated as described. These indices as well as a couple of tests results were 
used to determine the crisis period. The final dates for the crisis period in this study were set 
from 2008-01-01 to 2009-12-31. As can be seen in Figure 6, the CDS spread was magnified 
between these dates due to the fact that the market required a higher compensation for bearing 
credit risk as could be expected during a period in recession. Further, one could also argue 
that the periods in connection to the crisis are evidently relatively stable compared to the 
                                                          
21 Also, numerous previous studies have used a similar approach with the mean instead of median at index construction (Hull 
et al. 2004; Norden & Weber 2004; Ismailescu & Kazemi 2010; Finnerty at al. 2013)   
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chosen crisis period. The aggregated period consisting of the before crisis period and after 
crisis period will in this study be named the stable period.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  AA-, A-, Baa-, NIG index spreads (bps) for the total period. 
Further, in line with previous studies (Finnerty et al. 2014; Hull at al. 2004; Micu et al. 2006; 
Norden and Weber 2004) we use the index model to calculate abnormal returns (ARs). This 
model is simply the observed returns subtracted by the corresponding index. A company 
within a certain rating category for a specific day will have the index corresponding to that 
rating category as its normal performance measure. For instance, if a company is rated A+, A 
or A- at day 1 it will have the index named A as its normal performance measure on that day. 
Equation 2 summarizes the daily AR calculations where t is the day, i is a firm and ri 
corresponds to firm i’s rating category. The index 𝐼𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is also denoted as daily percentage 
changes. 
                                               𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑟𝑖,𝑡                                               (2) 
Further, we support Galil and Soffers (2011) discussion and critique regarding Norden and 
Webers (2004) approach, as Galil and Soffer (2011) state that any discontinuity within the 
event windows enables us to determine what actually caused the abnormality. Therefore, to 
avoid discontinuities of the AR calculations within the event windows, we keep the same 
index throughout the entire event window, even when a firm’s rating category changes and 
thereby its corresponding index due to a downgrade or upgrade within the event window.  
Lastly, in order to be able to draw general conclusions, the event windows to a specific event 
are aggregated into one single event window. Technically, this is done by calculating the daily 
average abnormal returns across the windows for each day within the event window as 
Equation 3. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
                                                              𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                (3) 
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To obtain a visual representation of the aggregated event window and to test specific window 
sections for significant abnormal performance, cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR)s 
are calculated for the different event types, as in Equation 4 (Mitchell & Netter, 1994). 22 
                                                           𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∏(1 + 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡) − 1                                                 (4)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
The results are presented graphically as CAR(-20, t) for t with the range -20 to 20.  As daily 
average spread returns, or percentage spread changes are cumulated as in Equation 4, the 
graphs that will later be presented in Section 5. Empirical results and discussion and should 
be interpreted as average abnormal spread changes denoted in percent. The spread change 
starts at zero just before the window and the observed spread fluctuation should ideally only 
be due to the investigated event. However, this is most certainly not completely true as some 
amount of the spread fluctuation is due to other variables that were not neutralized by the 
benchmark indices. Further and deeper discussion regarding the robustness of our results will 
be discussed next.  
4.2 Methodology assumptions and discussion 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) explain the theoretical and empirical issues concerning the 
event study methodology. They clarify that efficient markets, unanticipated events and no 
confounding events are the main assumptions that the event study methodology relies upon. 
In this section an explanation and discussion is outlined of how this study satisfies these 
assumption.  
Efficient markets imply that the prices incorporate all relevant new information, and as the 
event study methodology indirectly measures the significance of an event by observing prices 
changes it relies on this assumption. For instance, if the market would appear inefficient in 
some degree, the effect of the announcement could possibly be expressed after the 
investigated event window. (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) For this reason, the event window 
part [2, 20] is applied to check for inefficiency in some degree. Likewise, if the events are 
anticipated, the significance of the event at the actual event date would be underestimated. To 
check for anticipation in some degree the window part [-20, -2] is used. The event window   
                                                          
22 Instead of Equation 4 one can also simply sum the average abnormal returns. However, as we use percentage changes 
together with the fact that we did not want to underestimate the asymmetry between positive and negative events, we 
used Equation 4. Our final results are still the same for the two methods.  
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[-1, 1] was chosen in order to check for a significant abnormal spread reaction at the actual 
event day consistent with Finnerty et al. (2013).23 
Lastly, regarding the assumption of no confounding variables, which means that only the 
event effect is captured, we try to satisfy this in three ways as one can influence the degree of 
the assumption being satisfied which is not the case for the efficient market and non-
anticipation assumptions.  
Firstly, as events windows are aggregated as “average events windows”, and the 
announcement is the main systematically aggregated variable within the event window, 
confounding variables should diminish with larger sample size.24 Partly due to this (t-stats 
also require larger sample size, as it assumes normality), we try to keep the sample size higher 
by not dividing the investigated time into more than three periods; before, during, and after 
crisis as well as aggregating the before and after period as the stable period. However, it is 
important to note that, if the events cluster in time, across event windows, it does no longer 
have to be true that the event is the only systematically aggregated variable. Therefore an 
increased sample size would not weaken some confounding variables. As this study examines 
the relatively long period of 2600 trading days compared to the 370 investigated event days, 
cross-sectional event time clustering should not be of concern.  Thereby, an increased sample 
size should contribute to the robustness of the results.  
Secondly, a powerful measure of normal performance would also reduce the effects of other 
confounding variables. The benchmark index that we subtract from the spread, in some extent, 
isolates the investigated event from any fluctuations due to macroeconomic variables. Also 
as we change the index with respect to four different rating categories, the fact that entities 
with worse ratings have larger spread changes than those with better ratings, will be isolated 
in our study. Brown and Warner (1980) investigated the performance between different 
normal measures, such as the market adjusted return model (also called index adjusted return) 
as we use, the mean adjusted returns model, market model residuals method and a couple of 
other less used methods. They concluded that there was no clear winner and that the simplest 
models worked just as well as the more complicated models in certain conditions. This does 
not have to imply that the normal performance measure does not matter, as it could be an 
indication that none of the methods work well enough. An interesting idea would be to 
optimize an index to every investigated firm, by not aggregating every firm into the index, 
but only aggregating the firms with the strongest spread correlation to the investigated entity. 
                                                          
23 Regarding the length of an event window Brown and Warner (1980) find that the power of a t-statistic decreases for 
longer event windows and therefore the window should be as short as possible and simultaneously long enough to still 
capture the investigated event. 
24 The announcement may not be the “only” systematically aggregated variable. For instance, industry specific variables 
could have also been aggregated accidently. For this mater the word “main” is more accurate.  
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As strong correlation should mean that the majority of the variables that determine the spread 
are the same, it should imply that an index with a strong correlation to the entity would take 
more variables into account and therefore isolates these variables from the investigated 
spreads more efficiently. For example variables as industry and even more company specific 
variables would be taken into account. However, pure company specific events such as credit 
rating announcements would still not be isolated which is important as this is the variable that 
is investigated in the first place. Certainly other pure company specific variables such as a 
change of the CEO would also not be isolated and such confounding variables would still 
have to be isolated by hand.  
4.3 Alternative methodology  
Concerning the overviewed research in this study, all studies apply the event study 
methodology, while Finnerty et al. (2013), Norden & Weber (2004) and Ismailescu & Kazemi 
(2010) also complement this methodology with a dummy variable regression. In particular, 
they use the dummy variable regression in attempt to explain the variation of the individual 
event windows. As we investigate how the varied market conditions influence the results, this 
model would be a strong candidate as an alternative methodology or even a complement to 
this study. Some complementary regressions can be found in Appendix 5. 
Further, one could use pure alternatives to the event study methodology and simply compare 
the results between the crisis period and the stable period. Acharya (1993) presents three 
different pure event study alternatives and conducts simulation experiments to investigate the 
performance of these methods. A latent variable model suggested in Acharya (1986), a 
standard event study model, a dummy variable model and a truncated regression models were 
put to the test. Based on the results he concluded that the latent variable model had the best 
performance while the truncated regression had the worst. The standard model and the dummy 
variable model were close in performance to the latent variable model for high probability 
events, while for low probability events the two models tended to underestimate the 
significance of the abnormal returns.  For more detailed results and conclusions, see Acharya 
(1993).  
4.4 Statistical testing, assumptions and robustness  
There are plenty of different inference tests developed for the event study methodology. In 
this study, the parametric Cross-sectional t-test25 and as a robustness check the non-
parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank test26 are applied, mainly to be consistent regarding the fact 
that none of them require an estimation period. Shortly, the cross-sectional t-test is a 
                                                          
25 Specifically, it is the two-tailed one sample Cross-sectional t-test that is applied.  
26 More accurately, it is the two-tailed one sample Wilcoxon sign-rank test that is utilized.  
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parametric-test, identical to the standard student’s t-test, it tests whether the mean (average 
abnormal return) for a given day is different from zero, where the mean and variance of the 
mean is estimated across the event windows, and therefore it is robust against event-induced 
variance, shown by Brown and Warner (1980). To avoid any misunderstandings, we test 
CARs for the window parts [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] and not means (one day average 
abnormal returns). However, as CARs are only aggregated means and the CAR’s standard 
deviation is the sum of the means standard deviations the argument regarding robustness 
against event-induced variance still applies for CARs, as well as the discussions in the 
following two paragraphs.  
 
Beaver (1968) found that during events, regardless if any abnormal performance is present, 
the price variance tends to increase and thereby the name event induced-variance. If this 
phenomenon is not taken into account, the test may overestimate the significance of an 
observed abnormal return. Thereby, inferences drawn from the cross-sectional t-test will not 
overestimate the significance of events in this regard. However, to estimate the variance, the 
test assumes cross-sectional abnormal returns to be independently and identically distributed. 
As discussed before, independence is a reasonable assumption as the events do not cluster in 
time. Identically distributed abnormal returns are of much greater concern as this assumption 
is most certainly violated, also the direction and magnitude of this bias is uncertain in this 
study. Luckily, this problem can be solved in general by applying the powerful standardized 
cross-sectional t-test introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991). It uses an 
estimation period before each event to take the individual distributions into account, making 
the inference robust against event-induced variance and non-identical distributions.  
 
Lastly, due to the fact that the cross-sectional t-test is a parametric-test, it assumes the tested 
mean to be normally distributed. The central limit theorem states that the distribution of the 
mean will tend to a normal distribution as the sample size of the mean calculation increases. 
More importantly, the theorem states that the mean will tend to normality regardless of the 
underlying distribution of the sample. As seen in Appendix 3 the abnormal returns are 
certainly not normally distributed. Therefore according to the central limit theorem, a 
sufficient sample size will be required when calculating average abnormal returns so that these 
will be normally distributed when tested. Generally a sample size of 25 or 30 observations is 
said to be sufficient, though one should ideally do as Finnerty et al. (2013) and apply Browns 
and Warners (1980) simulation experiment to analyze the rejection frequencies of the t-test 
be varying the sample size. However, as we do not do this due to a time constraint, we apply 
a robustness check with the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank test instead (Ismailescu and 
Kazemi, 2010; Norden and Weber, 2004). This test is chosen as it is a non-parametric test and 
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its inference does not depend on the underlying distribution, hence it is a good complement 
to the parametric t-test. Lastly, it should be noted that the Wilcoxon test, in contrast to the t-
test checks whether the median of a distribution is significantly different from zero and no 
longer the mean.  
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5. Empirical results and discussion  
In this section, results and discussion will be intertwined and organized as follows. First, the 
aggregated positive and negative results will be presented graphically for all the investigated 
periods. Further, all the events are presented separately. These presentations are then followed 
by cross-sectional t-test results together with the Wilcoxon test as a robustness check. 
The graphs will always be presented in pairs of cumulative mean (average) and median 
abnormal returns, however the mean will primarily be discussed while the median will only 
be used as a robustness check to avoid discussing results that do not show stability. As a 
remainder, cumulative average abnormal returns should be interpreted as average abnormal 
spread changes denoted in percent. Further, black lines will always represent negative events 
while gray lines go with positive events.  
 
5.1 Positive and negative announcements 
Positive events pool upgrades and possible upgrades while negative events combine 
downgrades and possible downgrades. Due to this aggregation of events, the discussions of 
these results will be slightly more careful and from another point of view. For example, if we 
find that the downgrades and possible downgrades do not behave in a similar way at a certain 
period, the aggregated negative graph will not make sense for all sort of conclusions and 
thereby any attempt to explain this aggregated phenomena could be misleading. Therefore, 
the results discussed in depth in this section are chosen with care. Lastly, it should be 
mentioned that all the graphs in this section have the same scale and size to avoid any visual 
illusions.  
 
5.1.1 Total period - positive and negative announcements 
By starting to observe the total period, Figure 7 shows that for both positive and negative 
events the spread reacts in the expected direction in line with theory. The spread increases at 
negative events as the market requires a higher compensation to the new announced larger 
default risk. The opposite analogy yields for positive events. Further, both events indicate to 
be anticipated as the spread is widening before the announcement day [-20,2]. For negative 
events the anticipation corresponds to a 7% spread widening and this is followed by a reaction 
of a 7% spread increase around the event day. Similar result yield for positive events but the 
overall magnitude is reduced by two to three times for all the event window periods. These 
results indicate that Moody’s announcements contain price valuable information to the 
market, and this is especially true for negative announcements as it shows a stronger total 
reaction within the event window.  
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Fig. 7. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for negative and positive events for the total period.  
 
This asymmetry between positive and negative events has also consistently been found by 
previous research27. In particular, it has been found that the negative events show stronger 
anticipation and overall magnitude than positive events. As mentioned in the literature 
overview, this phenomenon has been motivated with the argument that media highlights 
negative news more than positive news and as a result negative events show stronger 
anticipation than positive events that could possibly be the explanation for our results as well. 
However, regarding the larger overall spread impact for negative events, researchers do not 
seem to discuss any particular reason for this finding. A possible explanation for this will be 
discussed in Section 5.1.3 During the crisis-positive and negative announcements.  
Lastly, after the announcement, the spread does not indicate any drift, or in other words, has 
a trend parallel to the x-axis, indicating that the market is efficient and incorporates all new 
information relatively fast after an announcement.  
5.1.2 Before the crisis - positive and negative announcements 
Regarding the results for the period before the crisis illustrated in Figure 8, we see a similar 
pattern as for the total period. Both events indicate to be slightly anticipated as the spread is 
widening before the announcement day [-20,2]. In contrast to the results for the total period 
and previous research, the anticipation is slightly stronger for positive events. Around the 
actual event day [-1,1] both event types show a greater reaction to the expected direction, 
where negative evens have a larger mean reaction than positive events. However, the overall 
mean spread reaction is very similar between the events and by observing the median event 
window, the positive events seem to have a larger reaction than negative events which show 
                                                          
27 The term “previous research” will refer to Hull et al. (2004), Norden & Weber (2004), Micu el al. (2004), Micu et al. 
(2006), Galil & Soffer (2011) as well as Finnerty et al. (2013) in the entire Section 5 – Empirical results and discussion 
to enable a more fluent reading. Ismailescu & Kazemi (2010) are not referred to as they have not concluded nor 
contradicted the results regarding the fact that negative events have a stronger total impact than positive events. It should 
also be stressed that Ismailescu & Kazemi (2010) is the only study not including corporations as the underlying entity.  
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a downward jump some days later after the announcement. This is contrary to prior findings 
as the market seems not to view negative announcements as informative as previously found. 
This suggests that the market had an optimistic view for the days ahead as it perceived 
negative news less informative which is an interesting result just before the financial crisis. 
This could in other words be described as “riding the wave”.  
 
Fig. 8. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for negative and positive events before the crisis.  
5.1.3 During the crisis - positive and negative announcements 
During the crisis, as seen in Figure 9, negative event are strongly anticipated as the spread 
increases with roughly 13% at [-20,-2]. It is the largest spread increase for any [-20,-2] period. 
There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. One explanation would be that 
the default fear increases during the crisis, and because of this, bad news and unstable 
companies get even more intensively monitored by the market, and thereby rating events get 
even more anticipated. Theoretically, this implies that when Moody’s announces its events, it 
would not have any impact on the spread any longer as the market already strongly anticipated 
these actions. However, the impact around [-1,1] is just as for the pre-crisis period 9%, 
meaning that our explanation to this phenomena should not yield, unless, once again because 
of the fear factor the market takes the certainty before the uncertainty and “overreacts” to the 
already incorporated information and thereby making it appear that the informational content 
during the crisis has increased. This could also be a reason why positive events neither show 
anticipation nor any impact on the announcement day, as the mean and median spread for 
positive events seem to follow a random walk along the x-axis. It should be noted that since 
the sample size for positive events during the crisis only is n=17 compared to the other periods 
with samples ranging from n=63 to n=209, strong conclusions for positive events during the 
crisis cannot be made. Lastly, the spread has a slight upward drift for the negative events after 
the event, at [2,20]. This will be discussed in Section 5.2.3 During the crisis – all 
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announcement types as the drift only is due to possible downgrades and not actual 
downgrades.  
Fig. 9. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for negative and positive events during the crisis.  
Regarding the sample size during the crisis, there were 63 negative events to the total 80 
events, implying 79% negative events during this period. This, in relation to 50% negative 
events before crisis, and 51% after crisis, the chosen crisis period appears to be a convincing 
choice.28 
5.1.4 After the crisis - positive and negative announcements 
Comparing the crisis period with the period after the crisis in Figure 10, we observe that 
negative events are no longer as strongly anticipated and the fact that there is no after-drift. 
Positive events also seem to contribute with new relevant information to the market as before 
the crisis. The overall shape of the curves are similar to the before crisis period, indicating 
that the crisis has passed, if we assume that this characteristics indicate a stable market. The 
major difference is the reduced overall magnitude of the events. Positive events have dropped 
by approximately 4% while negative events only dropped by 2%. These results are also found 
for the median spread, indicating that the market no longer views Moody’s rating 
announcements as relevant as before the crisis. One explained could simply be that credit 
rating agencies received a lot of critique during the crisis and as a consequence the market 
lost its faith for the rating announcements. Another possible explanation could be that this a 
characteristic post-crisis effect associated with the market psychology and has nothing to do 
with the previous explanation.  
                                                          
28 The periods 2007-2008 and 2007-2010 were also tested and results were still very similar to these. Thereby, any 
discussion regarding the “right” crisis period should not compromise the robustness of our conclusions. At request, the 
results for 2007-2008 and for 2007-2010 can be provided. 
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Fig. 10. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for negative and positive events after the crisis.  
Lastly, due to the larger magnitude reduction for positive events relative negative events, the 
asymmetry between negative and positive events is even larger after the crisis. This would 
once again be consistent with previous research regarding this asymmetry in general market 
conditions. However, almost none of the asymmetry is found for the median spread. The 
asymmetry is also consistent with the descriptive statistics for the CDS spreads and abnormal 
returns, as the distributions are positively skewed.29 This means that the probability is larger 
for outliers regarding a spread increase than a spread decrease, which would result in an 
asymmetry between the mean and median results as found.  
5.1.5 Stable period - positive and negative announcements 
By aggregating all the events from the before and after crisis periods we obtain the stable 
period as seen in Figure 11. Positive events seem to be slightly more anticipated in contrast 
to what was found for the total period. Also, the difference between the total reaction between 
positive and negative events seems to be reduced for the stable period. These two findings 
together with the result for the median spread, suggest that the asymmetry between negative 
and positive events reduce during periods of relative financial stability. The reaction at the 
event day is still magnified for negative events with an increase of 8% while positive events 
display half the effect with 4%. In addition, no drift is found after the event day. 
                                                          
29 The descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Fig. 11. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for negative and positive events for the stable period.  
5.2 All announcement types  
In this section all the event types (upgrades, downgrades, possible upgrades and possible 
downgrades) will be presented and discussed for the different periods. Consistent with the 
previous section, this section will also display graphs with the same scale to simplify the 
comparison between results from different periods.  
5.2.1 Total period – all announcement types 
Regarding all the event types for the total period as seen in Figure 12, all announcement types 
impact the spread in the expected direction in line with theory as was seen for the pooled 
positive and negative events. Further, there seems to be no difference between possible 
upgrades and actual upgrades, and comparing possible downgrades and actual downgrades 
only the stronger reaction for possible downgrades around [-1,1] seems to differ. The overall 
anticipation and the total impact is slightly stronger for negative events than for positive 
events, consistent with previous research. Further, no announcements show any strong drift 
after the announcement, once again indicating an efficient market as it incorporates the new 
information within one to two days. The result that stands out is that possible downgrades 
have the strongest overall impact which has also consistently been found among previous 
research.  
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Fig. 12. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for upgrades, downgrades, possible downgrades and 
possible upgrades for the total period.  
5.2.2 Before the crisis – all announcement types 
As mentioned before, previous research has found that the overall magnitude and anticipation 
is stronger for negative events. Our results in Figure 13 contradict both these findings for the 
pre-crisis period. Upgrades are most anticipated, and the final mean spread level is around 
10% for all event types except for possible upgrades, which fall slightly behind the 10% 
change mark. At [-1,1] possible downgrades have the greatest impact on the spread, raising it 
from approximately 2% to 14%. However, 8 days later the spread drops  
close to the 10% level as mentioned.   
Fig. 13. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for upgrades, downgrades, possible downgrades and 
possible upgrades before the crisis.  
Also, the median spread for negative events, does not follow the mean spread as good as it 
does for positive events, again indicating that positive events have a greater impact than 
previous research suggests. In addition, for both negative events, the median spread shows a 
reaction on the event day, but around 8 days later, at t=8, the spread level starts falling and 
ends up at, or close to 0%.  
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To summarize, these results show that the market is rather optimistic compared to prior 
research, as the market seems to react rather softly to negative events, and stronger for 
positive. These findings are interesting, as the market shows optimistic behavior just before 
the financial crisis, indicating that the market has no clue of what is coming. The sample size 
ranges from n=29 to n=44 which is on the edge of being too small in common statistical 
practice, as n=30 is supposed to be a good number, no matter of the underlying distribution.  
5.2.3 During the crisis - all announcement types 
During the crisis, results show that negative events have a greater role regarding informational 
content with a positive impact of 37% for possible downgrades and 15% for downgrades. 
Considering possible upgrades we see that for the first 10 days within the event window, the 
spread identically increases as for the entities that have a negative rating announcement ahead 
of them. This result has only 5 observations and could therefore be greatly biased. When we 
observed the individual 5 entities only one of them showed this behavior which is supported 
by the median in Figure 14. However, the downward impact at around 10 days before the 
announcement was true for all the 5 entities, suggesting that possible upgrades could be 
anticipated during crisis, but does not show any reaction on the announcement day. Moreover, 
by taking the median and mean into account when observing upgrades, it seems to follow a 
random walk along the x-axis, suggesting there is no informational value in upgrades. This 
could be due to the fear factor increase during the crisis as discussed earlier in Section 5.1.3 
During crisis - positive and negative events.  
Fig. 14. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for upgrades, downgrades, possible downgrades and 
possible upgrades during the crisis.  
Among possible and actual downgrades, anticipation is almost identical. Around the event 
day, reviews show a substantially greater impact than downgrades, with a spread increase of 
15%, similar to what was found before the crisis. Nevertheless, negative reviews no longer 
have any downward drift around day t=8 as before the crisis, and rather shows a positive drift 
with a spread increase of 10% units at [2,20]. Downgrades do not show any such drift.  
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An explanation to why only possible downgrades show this drift and not downgrades could 
be the fact that rating reviews are often proceeded by actual rating changes, and because of 
this, the market starts to anticipate a rating change immediately after a rating review. The 
possible downgrade drift at [2,20] has the same slope as the anticipation drift at [-20,-2] for 
downgrades, slightly supporting our explanation. However, a further explanation why this 
only yields for the crisis period could be due to the mentioned fear factor, leading the market 
to take the certainty before the uncertainty and thereby starts to anticipate the next event as 
soon as there are signs. Another explanation could be that the probability of downgrades after 
rating reviews were probably much greater during the crisis, and anticipating downgrades 
directly after negative reviews would be a natural reaction.  
Comparing the results found in this section with Finnerty et al. (2013), who are one of few 
researchers that have slightly considered market conditions in their analysis, we receive 
directly contradicting results. In particular, their study only observes upgrades and 
downgrades for this matter and finds that upgrades but not downgrades show a stronger 
impact on the spread, which is opposite to our findings. For the years 2001-2002 and 2008 
they present to have a combined sample size of 20 upgrades as well as 65 downgrades which 
is similar to our positive and negative ratio, during the crisis period, 17/63. Further, they 
conduct a similar event study methodology. Indices are constructed with different rating 
categories and are subtracted from the spread to obtain abnormal returns identical to our 
approach in this regard. However, there are two different aspects that we believe to be of great 
importance regarding the different results. Firstly, they use absolute spread changes instead 
of percentage spread changes as a proxy for returns. As discussed in the methodology, this 
leads to the fact that companies with larger spread levels will most likely have a greater 
importance at aggregation, as for the creation of the indices. Secondly, as they calculate their 
indices as the mean and not the median spread, outliers will have a greater influence on the 
indices as well. These two factors, during financial distress, would imply that the indices 
would be biased towards the entities with higher spreads as there would naturally be more 
firms with higher spreads as well as outliers in this direction at such periods. Finally, these 
indices are subtracted from the spreads and as a consequence, during recession, it would have 
a tendency to neutralize negative announcements while exaggerating positive announcements 
under the assumption that spread levels are lower for firms receiving positive announcements 
during such periods. As this study uses percentage changes as a proxy for returns, median for 
index aggregation and removes heavy outliers with care, we believe our methodology is more 
suited for analysis during recessions and therefore we would argue that our results are more 
representative for such periods. However, Finnerty et al. (2013) mainly cover the Dot-com 
crisis and only the beginning of the Subprime-crisis. This, together with the fact that they 
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investigate S&P instead of Moody’s as well as entities not only restricted to the North 
American market, could be an explanation of these split results. 
5.2.4 After the crisis - all announcement types 
Figure 15 certainly shows that the crisis has had an impact on how the market perceives 
Moody’s announcements. Overall we see that actual rating changes, both negative and 
positive, no longer seem to have any substantial impact on the spread while rating reviews 
still show importance.  
Fig. 15. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for upgrades, downgrades, possible downgrades and 
possible upgrades after the crisis.  
More in detail, downgrades follow the 0% level throughout the window, except around the 
event day where the spread ends up at 4%, but falls down again around 10 days after the event. 
The median does the opposite to this, indicating that there is no robustness in these results, 
further implying that downgrades do not contain any new information to the market. Upgrades 
had a spread impact of around 11% before the crisis, and has now been reduced to a maximum 
impact of 2,5% in the expected direction.  
Possible downgrades still have an overall impact of 15%, similar to what it had before the 
crisis, although the median indicates that it is less volatile now than before the crisis, meaning 
that the results are more consistent than before the crisis. Lastly, possible upgrades have 
doubled its informational content from 5% to 10%. However, on day 20 they seem to have 
the same spread level, although the median still slightly indicates that the informational 
content has increased for possible upgrades after the crisis.  
As was found for pooled positive and negative events after the crisis, the market no longer 
perceived Moody´s rating announcements as relevant as before the crisis. In this analysis we 
can see that only actual rating changes has considerably lost its informational value. The 
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explanation for this could still be aligned with what was discussed for the results after the 
crisis concerning the pooled positive and negative events. 
5.2.5 Stable period - all announcement types 
Observing all the announcement types for the stable period in Figure 16 we see a similar 
overall pattern with the total period. In addition, the asymmetry between positive and negative 
events is reduced as downgrades show a mirrored image of the positive events while possible 
downgrades still show such distinct reaction especially at announcement. These findings 
suggest that during calm periods, the difference in magnitude, especially between downgrades 
and positive events, is not as great. 
Fig. 16. Cumulative mean and median abnormal returns for upgrades, downgrades, possible downgrades and 
possible upgrades for the stable period.  
5.3 Further results 
Apart from reviews for downgrade during the crisis, no events show any convincing further 
drift after the announcement day. Especially after day 1, the spread typically loses its drift 
completely and follows a rather strictly horizontal path, denoting that the market exploits the 
price-worth information mostly within one day after an announcement. Additionally, the 
events that had an impact on the actual day were always more or less anticipated by the 
market. These two results together strongly suggest that the market is efficient regarding the 
utilization of the informational content found in Moody’s announcements. This type of 
efficiency would theoretically be described as semi-strong due to the direct utilization of the 
information at the announcement, and a slight tendency toward strong efficiency regarding 
the fact that anticipation was more or less always observed.  
These results are important as the event study’s fundamental assumption is efficient markets, 
or specifically semi-strong efficiency as discussed earlier in Section 4.2 - Methology 
assumptions and discussion. Without a semi-efficient market, there would be a risk that the 
spread would react before the event window (strong efficiency) or after the event window 
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(week efficiency), not allowing us to determine the informational content of Moody’s 
announcements. However, it is important to stress that the existence of informational content 
and the proper degree of market efficiency reveal each other. Without one another, there 
would be no reaction within the event window and no conclusions could be made regarding 
which one of these do not exist. As our results clearly show significant reaction, we can 
discuss informational content and further state that the degree of market efficiency is in line 
with the methodology assumptions.  
5.4 Testing statistical significance of results 
In this section, the previous presented results are tested for significance with the two-sided 
cross-sectional t-test. These results will further be checked for robustness with the two-sided 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test and only commented when stronger contradicting significance is 
found for the two tests. Specifically, the Wilcoxon test will only be mentioned when it shows 
no significance of the event for any confidence level and contradicts the cross-sectional t-test. 
With this being said, the Wilcoxon test results are provided in Appendix – 4. Overall the 
results between the two methods are very similar. 
5.4.1 Positive and negative announcements - significance test 
Table 4, shows significance testing results for positive and negative events for all event 
window parts; [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20]. These are tested in relation to the periods before, 
during, after the crisis as well as for the stable and total period.  
 
Table 4
Results for the two tailed, Cross-sectional t-test, that test if the cumulative average abnormal returns are
different from zero for pooled positive and negative events with respect to the eventwindow parts 
[-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] and for the total period as well as before, during, after the crisis and stable period. 
Positive events Negative events
CAR n P-value CAR n P-value
Total [-20, -2] -2,52% 160 0,1140 6,13% 209 0,0000 ***
[-1, 1] -2,62% 160 0,0000 *** 7,41% 209 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] 0,24% 160 0,8109 0,59% 209 0,6433
Before [-20, -2] -3,92% 73 0,1768 3,22% 73 0,2115
[-1, 1] -4,70% 73 0,0000 *** 8,19% 73 0,0028 ***
[2, 20] 0,30% 73 0,9218 -0,62% 73 0,8081
During [-20, -2] 1,44% 17 0,7454 12,94% 63 0,0001 ***
[-1, 1] -0,04% 17 0,9803 7,34% 63 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] -1,38% 17 0,7791 2,86% 63 0,2768
After [-20, -2] -1,71% 70 0,1926 3,19% 74 0,1040
[-1, 1] -2,53% 70 0,0151 ** 6,27% 74 0,0001 ***
[2, 20] 0,88% 70 0,5865 0,26% 74 0,8415
Stable [-20, -2] -2,83% 143 0,0782 * 3,30% 146 0,0421 **
[-1, 1] -3,64% 143 0,0000 *** 7,43% 146 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] 0,60% 143 0,7348 -0,38% 146 0,7892
*  Significance at 10%
**  Significance at 5%
***  Significance at 1%
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By observing negative events we find that these are significant at 1%-level for all the 
investigated periods on the announcement day. Positive events show similar results except for 
the crisis period were no significance is found. Further, regarding anticipation for negative 
events, 1%-significance is found for the total period and the crisis period, while the stable 
period shows a 5%-significance. Wilcoxon only contradicts the latter finding as no 
significance is found. Moreover, no significant anticipation is found for positive events except 
for the stable period. However, it is not supported by the robustness check. These results more 
or less confirm the main graphical findings. In particular, that the anticipation for negative 
events is significant during the crisis as well as for the total period. Regarding positive events, 
they show significance for all periods except for the crisis period. The latter result could 
suggest an explanation for the mixed previous research results concerning positive events. 
However, the sample size is only n=17 during the crisis for the positive events.  
5.4.2 All announcements types – significance test 
Table 5, shows significance testing results for all announcements types. Specifically, for all 
event window parts; [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] that are tested in relation to the periods before, 
during, after the crisis as well as for the stable and total period.  
 
Considering upgrades, all periods except for the crisis period show significance at 1%. In 
addition, anticipation show no significance for any period. Similar results are found for 
possible upgrades except for the fact that significance is not found for the period after the 
crisis. These results are rather consistent with our graphical results except for the period after 
Table 5
Results for the two tailed, Cross-sectional t-test, that test if the cumulative average abnormal returns are different from zero for all
the event types with respect to the eventwindow parts [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] and for the total period as well as before, during,
after the crisis and stable periods. 
Upgrades Possible upgrade Downgrades Possible downgrade
CAR n P-value CAR n P-value CAR n P-value CAR n P-value
Total [-20, -2] -2,52% 101 0,1872 -2,17% 59 0,3757 6,35% 91 0,0032 *** 5,81% 119 0,0036 ***
[-1, 1] -2,62% 101 0,0001 *** -4,35% 59 0,0034 *** 3,26% 91 0,0058 *** 10,44% 119 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] 0,24% 101 0,9074 0,62% 59 0,8232 -0,51% 91 0,8026 1,68% 119 0,2987
Before [-20, -2] -6,71% 37 0,1472 -1,08% 36 0,7597 4,39% 29 0,2406 2,42% 44 0,4930
[-1, 1] -5,00% 37 0,0014 *** -4,39% 36 0,0047 *** 3,77% 29 0,1756 11,18% 44 0,0082 ***
[2, 20] 1,54% 37 0,7363 -1,05% 36 0,8017 0,68% 29 0,8720 -1,54% 44 0,6306
During [-20, -2] 2,40% 12 0,6320 -1,25% 5 0,9131 11,81% 35 0,0064 *** 14,24% 28 0,0030 ***
[-1, 1] 0,40% 12 0,8256 -1,07% 5 0,7899 3,32% 35 0,0333 ** 12,52% 28 0,0001 ***
[2, 20] -2,29% 12 0,7250 0,63% 5 0,9381 -0,18% 35 0,9587 6,71% 28 0,0967 *
After [-20, -2] -0,63% 52 0,6595 -4,78% 18 0,1212 1,55% 27 0,5615 4,12% 47 0,1273
[-1, 1] -1,60% 52 0,0041 *** -5,20% 18 0,1729 2,51% 27 0,1176 8,45% 47 0,0003 ***
[2, 20] -0,16% 52 0,9319 3,88% 18 0,2213 -2,30% 27 0,3461 1,75% 47 0,2612
Stable [-20, -2] -3,18% 89 0,1253 -2,30% 54 0,3660 3,03% 56 0,1881 3,32% 91 0,1308
[-1, 1] -3,02% 89 0,0000 *** -4,65% 54 0,0037 *** 3,21% 56 0,0536 * 9,79% 91 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] 0,57% 89 0,7953 0,60% 54 0,8395 -0,73% 56 0,7694 0,16% 91 0,9271
*  Significance at 10%
**  Significance at 5%
***  Significance at 1%
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the crisis, as upgrades are still significant but possible upgrades are not. This does not allow 
us to state that the weakened informational content of rating announcement is due to the 
decreased significance of actual rating changes. However, it should still be noted that possible 
upgrades have a rather small sample size of n=18 after the crisis that is of concern.  
Further, downgrades during the event day show 1%-significance for the total period, 5%-
significance during the crisis and 10%-significance during the stable period. However, the 
latter significant result is not confirmed by the robustness test. Additionally, anticipation is 
found to be significant at the 1%-level during the crisis and the total period. By these results, 
downgrades seem only to be significant for the total period as well as for the crisis period but 
not for any stable period. As previous research also obtained mixed results concerning 
downgrades, the different market conditions could be a possible explanation for this 
inconsistency. Lastly, possible downgrades show significance at 1%-level regardless of 
market conditions and anticipation is only found significant during the crisis and the total 
period. This finding is directly consistent with the graphical findings and also consistent with 
prior studies.  
To summarize, these results propose that the informational value, specifically for positive 
announcements, downgrades and anticipation of the negative events, are dependent on the 
underlying market conditions. Therefore further research should take this variable into 
account for more accurate conclusions. With this being said, these results alone are not 
sufficient to state any strong guidelines but rather only propose suggestions. This study is 
lacking in several important aspects. Firstly, we believe that the sample for positive events 
during the crisis is not sufficient as it only contains n=17 observations. Secondly, we would 
argue that the main issue concerning this study is that we only cover one single global crisis 
period. As any other single observation, the crisis of 2008-2009 could have its own specific 
characteristics and therefore a data sample covering multiple global crises would be more 
representative. Lastly, a similar argument could criticize our restrictions to a specific credit 
rating agency and geographical market. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this study we investigated the relationship between CDS spreads and credit rating 
announcements during different market conditions as these results would be of interest for 
market participants. An event study methodology was conducted to examine rating 
announcements by Moody’s during the last decade, including the Subprime crisis of 2008-
2009.  
In line with previous research we find that possible downgrades show the strongest significant 
impact on CDS spreads, and in this study it was true regardless of market conditions as it 
showed significance impact for all periods. Regarding the mixed prior results concerning 
actual downgrades and positive events, we find that downgrades show a significant impact 
only during recession, while the positive events only showed informational significance 
during stable periods. Further, for the total period, all announcement types show a significant 
spread impact at the announcement day. 
We find three new results. Firstly, we find that none of the announcement types show any 
significant anticipation during the stable period and that only negative events display 
significant anticipation during recession and the total period. Secondly, we contradict Finnerty 
et al. (2013) and discover that, during the crisis, positive events show no significant impact 
on the spread. In addition, both negative events show a significant enlarged impact, mostly 
due to magnified anticipation. Lastly, after the crisis, Moody’s ratings announcements, both 
pooled positive and pooled negative announcements lose some of its impact magnitude 
compared to before the crisis. The latter finding suggests that the informational content of 
Moody’s rating announcements has decreased after the crisis. 
In sum, our findings propose that the informational content of positive announcements, 
downgrades and anticipation of the negative events are dependent on the underlying market 
conditions, and therefore suggest future research within this topic to take this variable into 
account for more accurate conclusions.   
Further extensions to consider for future research could be to conduct similar studies, ideally 
covering other global crisis periods as well as larger data sets concerning positive 
announcements during the recession period. 
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Appendix 1 – Credit rating table  
 
 
 
Credit rating table
Long-term corporate credit ratings used by Moody’s, Fitch and S&P
Credit quality Moody’s Fitch S&P Default rate
Highest quality Aaa AAA AAA 0.000
Very strong Aa1 AA+ AA+
payment capacity Aa2 AA AA 0.037
Aa3 AA- AA-
Investment 
grade debt Strong A1 A+ A+
payment capacity A2 A A 0.042
A3 A- A-
Adequate Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
payment capacity Baa2 BBB BBB 0.210
Baa3 BBB- BBB-
Payment capacity is Ba1 BB+ BB+
vulnerable to adverse Ba2 BB BB 1.069
conditions Ba3 BB- BB-
Payment capacity is B1 B+ B+
l ikely to be impaired by B2 B B 6.185
adverse conditions B3 B- B-
Speculative
grade debt Payment capacity is Caa1 CCC+ CCC+
dependent upon Caa2 CCC CCC 16.095
sustained favourable Caa3 CCC- CCC-
conditions CC CC
C
In or near default Ca DDD C 32.493
C DD D
D
  Moody's  average annual  Issuer-Weighted Corporate Default Rates  by 
Alphanumeric Rating, 1983-2010
Sources : Company webs ites
  
 
 
 
Final sample   
Composition of the CDS data set by firm and period
No. Corporation name Sector        No. CDS spreads & Credit events
      Before      During        After
1 21st Century Fox America Inc. TMT 807 2 523 2 1270 0
2 ACE Limited FIN 807 0 251 0 0 0
3 Aetna Inc. FIN 807 3 523 0 1270 4
4 Allstate Corp. FIN 807 0 523 3 1270 0
5 Altria Group Inc. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 0
6 American Electrical Power Company Inc. ENRG 807 1 523 3 1270 1
7 American Express Company FIN 807 0 523 4 1270 0
8 American International Group Inc. FIN - 0 - 0 - 0
9 Amgen Inc. CONS 807 0 523 2 1270 0
10 Anadarko Petroleum Corp. ENRG 807 4 523 0 1270 2
11 Arrow Electronics Inc. TMT 807 0 523 0 1270 0
12 Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. FIN - 0 - 0 - 0
13 AT&T Inc. TMT 807 2 523 0 1270 4
14 AutoZone Inc. CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 1
15 Avnet Inc. TMT 807 0 523 1 1270 0
16 Avon Products Inc. CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 7
17 Barrick Gold Corp. INDU 807 1 523 0 1270 2
18 Baxter International Inc. CONS 807 1 523 0 1270 1
19 Beam Suntory Inc. CONS 14 0 523 2 1270 1
20 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. FIN 807 0 523 1 1270 0
21 Block Financial LLC FIN 807 2 523 0 1270 2
22 Boeing Company INDU 807 2 523 0 1270 0
23 Boston Scientific Corp. CONS 807 4 523 1 1270 1
24 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company CONS 807 3 523 0 1270 0
25 Campbell Soup Company CONS 807 0 523 2 1270 3
26 Capital One Bank FIN 807 4 523 1 1270 1
27 Cardinal Health Inc. CONS 807 1 523 2 1270 2
28 Carnival Corp. CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 1
29 Caterpillar Inc. INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 0
30 CBS Corp. INDU 512 0 523 0 1270 1
31 Chubb Corp. FIN 807 0 523 0 1270 0
32 Comcast Corp. TMT 807 1 523 2 1270 1
33 Computer Sciences Corp. TMT 807 4 523 0 1270 2
34 ConAgra Food Inc. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 2
35 ConocoPhilips ENRG 807 2 523 0 1270 1
36 Cox Communications Inc. TMT 807 0 523 0 1270 1
37 CSX Corporation INDU 807 1 523 0 1270 2
38 CVS Health Corp. CONS 807 3 523 0 1270 1
39 Darden Restaurants Inc. CONS 807 1 523 0 1270 4
40 Deere & Company INDU 807 1 523 0 1270 0
41 Devon Energy Corp. ENRG 807 3 523 0 1270 1
42 DIRECTV Holdings LLC TMT 807 1 523 2 1270 4
43 Dominion Resources Inc. ENRG 807 2 523 0 1270 1
44 Dow Chemical Company INDU 807 0 523 2 1270 1
45 Duke Energy Carolinas LLC ENRG 807 1 523 0 1270 4
46 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company INDU 807 1 523 0 1270 1
47 Eastman Chemical Company INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 0
48 ERP Operating Limited Partnership FIN 130 0 523 0 195 0
49 Exelon Corp. ENRG 806 1 523 1 1270 3
50 Expedia Inc. CONS 353 2 523 1 1270 0
Appendix 2 - Corporations included in this study  
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(continued)
Composition of the CDS data set by firm and period
No. Corporation name Sector        No. CDS spreads & Credit events
      Before      During        After
51 FirstEnergy Corp. ENRG 807 0 523 0 1270 0
52 Ford Motor Company CONS - 0 - 0 - 0
53 Freeport-McMoRan Inc. INDU 217 1 523 1 1270 2
54 Gap Inc. CONS 807 2 249 0 941 0
55 General Electric Capital Corp. FIN - 0 - 0 - 0
56 General Mills Inc. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 2
57 Genworth Holdings Inc. FIN - 0 - 0 - 0
58 Halliburton Company ENRG 807 4 523 0 1270 0
59 Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. FIN 807 1 523 4 1270 0
60 Hewlett-Packard Company TMT 807 2 523 0 1270 5
61 Home Depot Inc. CONS 807 1 523 0 1270 2
62 Honeywell International Inc. INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 0
63 Ingersoll-Rand Company INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 1
64 International Business Machines Corp. TMT 807 1 523 1 1270 2
65 International Paper Company INDU 807 2 523 0 1270 1
66 Johnson Controls Inc. CONS 807 3 523 2 1270 3
67 Kinder Morgan Energy Partners L.P. ENRG 807 2 523 0 1270 1
68 Kohl´s Corp. CONS 807 1 523 0 1270 0
69 Kroger Company CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 0
70 Lockheed Martin Corporation INDU 807 1 523 0 1270 0
71 Loews Corp. FIN 807 3 523 0 1270 1
72 Lowe´s Companies Inc. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 1
73 M.D.C. Holdings Inc. INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 1
74 Macy´s Inc. CONS 807 2 523 4 1270 3
75 Marriot International Inc. CONS 807 0 523 1 1270 1
76 Marsh & McLennan Companies Inc. FIN 807 0 523 0 1270 1
77 McDonald´s Corp. CONS 807 1 523 0 1270 2
78 McKesson Corp. CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 3
79 Mead Westvaco Corp. INDU 807 2 523 2 1270 1
80 MetLife Inc. FIN 807 0 523 1 1270 0
81 Mondelez International Inc. CONS 16 0 523 1 1270 1
82 Motorola Solutions Inc. TMT 807 2 523 4 1270 3
83 Nabors Industries Inc. ENRG 807 0 523 2 1270 1
84 National Rural Util ities Corp. ENRG 807 0 523 0 1270 0
85 Newell Rubbermaid Inc. CONS 807 0 523 2 1270 0
86 Newmont Mining Corp. INDU 807 1 523 1 1270 3
87 Nordstrom Inc. CONS 807 0 523 1 1270 2
88 Norfolk Southern Corp. INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 0
89 Northrop Grumman Corp. INDU 807 2 523 0 1270 0
90 Omnicom Group Inc. TMT 807 0 523 0 1270 0
91 Pfizer Inc. CONS 807 2 523 2 1270 0
92 Pitney Bowes Inc. TMT 807 2 523 0 1270 4
93 Procter & Gamble Company CONS 807 1 523 0 1270 0
94 Prudential Financial Inc. FIN 807 1 523 2 1270 1
95 Quest Diagnostics Inc. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 1
96 Raytheon Company INDU 807 4 523 0 1270 1
97 Reynolds American Inc. CONS 0 0 400 0 1270 2
98 Ryder System Inc. INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 0
99 Safeway Inc. CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 3
100 Sempra Energy ENRG 807 0 523 0 1270 0
(continued on next page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
Composition of the CDS data set by firm and period
No. Corporation name Sector        No. CDS spreads & Credit events
      Before      During        After
101 Sherwin-Williams Company INDU 807 1 523 0 1270 1
102 Simon Property Group L.P. FIN 807 4 523 0 1270 1
103 Southwest Airlines Company. CONS 807 0 523 1 1270 1
104 Staples, Inc. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 0
105 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Inc. CONS 807 2 523 2 1270 3
106 Target Corp. CONS 807 3 523 0 1270 0
107 Teck Resources Limited ENRG 3 0 177 1 1270 2
108 Time Warner Cable Inc. TMT 176 0 523 0 1270 2
109 Time Warner Inc. TMT 807 2 523 0 1270 0
110 Transocean Inc. ENRG 807 3 523 0 1270 2
111 Tyson Foond Inc. CONS 807 3 523 2 1270 3
112 Union Pacific Corp. INDU 807 0 523 0 1270 2
113 United Health Group Inc. FIN 807 2 523 1 1270 1
114 United Parcel Service Inc. CONS 807 2 523 1 1270 1
115 Valero Energy Corp. ENRG 807 1 523 2 1270 0
116 Viacom Inc. TMT 807 0 523 0 1270 0
117 Verizon Communications Inc. TMT 744 4 523 0 1270 0
118 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. CONS 807 0 523 0 1270 1
119 Walt Disney Company TMT 807 0 523 1 1270 1
120 Weatherford International Limited ENRG 807 0 523 2 1270 2
121 Weyerhaeuser Company INDU 807 2 523 2 1270 2
122 Whirlpool Corp. CONS 807 2 523 0 1270 1
123 Xerox Corp. TMT 807 3 523 0 1270 0
124 XLIT Ltd. FIN 3 0 4 0 888 0
125 YUM! Brands Inc. CONS 807 2 523 2 1270 0
FIN = financials 
CONS = consumer goods 
ENERG = energy 
INDU = industrials 
TMT = telecommunications, media & technology 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Descriptive statistics 
In this Appendix the descriptive statistics are provided with respect to period, sector and rating 
category for the spreads in its natural form as well as a graphical probability density function 
and descriptive statistics for the abnormal returns. All this data concerns the final sample of 
the 120 entities that were studied in this paper.  
 
By observing Panel A in Table of Descriptive statistics, one can see that the crisis period has 
all the characteristics that are associated with a period of recession compared to the other 
periods. To be clear, specifically the standard deviation, mean, median, maximum and 
minimum spreads are magnified for this period. As the crisis period is shorter, it also conveys 
fewer CDS spread quotes as expected. One should also note that the after period is not as 
stable as the period before the crisis. Concerning Panel B, consumer goods have the largest 
Table of Descriptive statistics
Panel A
Descriptive statistics concerning CDS spreads for the final sample with respect to period
Number of Standard
Period mid-quotes Deviation Mean Median Max Min Kurtosis Skewness
Before 90117 29,35 38,64 31,20 378,30 1,50 12,45 2,83
Crisis 61218 131,52 141,47 96,80 1352,60 7,50 9,49 2,65
After 149344 67,76 96,13 77,27 911,91 10,21 9,42 2,32
Stable 237384 62,34 74,02 53,92 911,91 1,50 10,80 2,48
Total 300679 86,06 88,13 61,70 1352,60 1,50 19,45 3,42
Panel B
Descriptive statistics concerning CDS spreads for the final sample with respect to sector
Number of Standard
Period mid-quotes Deviation Mean Median Max Min Kurtosis Skewness
CONS 113423 81,55 85,00 60,50 1053,50 1,50 18,02 3,33
ENERG 43043 72,83 87,37 61,10 737,58 6,00 9,10 2,31
FIN 39194 124,02 108,40 70,03 1352,60 6,50 13,70 3,18
INDU 61513 75,78 80,27 57,20 1165,00 5,80 27,60 3,84
TMT 46106 76,64 88,17 65,20 688,80 5,20 8,48 2,48
Panel C
Descriptive statistics concerning CDS spreads for the final sample with respect to rating category
Number of Standard
Period mid-quotes Deviation Mean Median Max Min Kurtosis Skewness
Aaa/Aa 14297 50,13 44,53 33,76 525,00 1,50 17,23 3,48
A 85183 70,79 59,27 41,32 1352,60 5,20 47,85 5,61
Baa 186896 86,94 101,42 76,70 1151,88 3,60 15,73 3,08
NIG 14156 115,06 155,21 136,29 1165,00 10,00 12,48 2,77
CONS = Consumer goods, ERERG = Energy, FIN = Finacials, INDU = Indutrials, TMT = Telecom/Media/Tecnology
 
 
number of quotes while financials have the least and seem to have most of the recession 
characteristics. Lastly, Panel C shows a very consistent pattern where the higher rated firms 
show CDS spreads that have more stable characteristics, while the opposite is found for the 
lower rated firms, as one would expect. In addition, the AAA/AA rating category as well as 
the non-investment grade category show a substantially lower number of CDS spreads, while 
Baa is the most dominant in this regard. Overall, independently of the point of view we are 
observing the spread, it always shows a positively skewed distribution.  
As illustrated in Figure Distribution the approximated probability density curve for the 
abnormal returns is not normally distributed as it shows a magnified kurtosis as well as a 
positively skewed distribution. The mean and median is zero and indicate that the benchmark 
index subtracted by the spread has neutralized these attributes.  
 
Fig. Distribution. Approximated probability density function for the abnormal returns compared to the normal 
distribution with the same mean and standard deviation parameters as the abnormal returns. 
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Appendix 4 – Robustness check 
In this appendix, results for the two tailed Wilcoxon sign-rank test are provided for both 
negative/positive events as well as for all event types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled positive and negative announcements - Wilcoxon sign-rank test
Results for the two tailed, sign-rank Wilcoxon test, that test if the median of the distribution for the
abnormal returns that are used for calculating  the eventwindow parts [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] is 
different from zero in regard to the total period as well as before, during,  after crissis and stable period. 
Positiv events Negative events
CAR n P-value CAR n P-value
Total [-20, -2] -0,22% 160 0,1746 0,14% 209 0,0049 ***
[-1, 1] -1,14% 160 0,0000 *** 2,31% 209 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] 0,00% 160 0,2852 -0,04% 209 0,9429
Before [-20, -2] -1,50% 73 0,3666 -0,24% 73 0,3914
[-1, 1] -3,20% 73 0,0000 *** 4,07% 73 0,0113 **
[2, 20] -0,67% 73 0,5905 -1,86% 73 0,2626
During [-20, -2] -2,72% 17 0,7893 3,90% 63 0,0006 ***
[-1, 1] -1,05% 17 0,6741 3,55% 63 0,0001 ***
[2, 20] 0,30% 17 0,5896 0,03% 63 0,1395
After [-20, -2] -0,77% 70 0,5028 -0,02% 74 0,6052
[-1, 1] -0,64% 70 0,0021 *** 1,02% 74 0,0008 ***
[2, 20] 0,19% 70 0,6406 0,10% 74 0,8637
Stable [-20, -2] -0,35% 143 0,1814 0,06% 146 0,3054
[-1, 1] -1,14% 143 0,0000 *** 1,65% 146 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] 0,03% 143 0,3531 -0,02% 146 0,2576
*  Significance at 10%
**  Significance at 5%
***  Significance at 1%
All announcements - Wilcoxon sign-rank test
Results for the two tailed, sign-rank Wilcoxon test, that test if the median of the distribution for the abnormal returns that are used for 
calculating the median CARs for the event window parts [-20,-2], [-1,1] and [2,20] is different from zero in regard to the total period as 
well as before, during,  after crissis and stable periods. 
Upgrades Possible upgrade Downgrades Possible downgrade
CAR n P-value CAR n P-value CAR n P-value CAR n P-value
Total [-20, -2] -0,24% 101 0,3641 -0,37% 59 0,3021 0,56% 91 0,0360 ** 0,33% 119 0,0608 *
[-1, 1] -1,12% 101 0,0000 *** -1,33% 59 0,0029 *** 1,07% 91 0,0400 ** 3,67% 119 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] -0,01% 101 0,1755 -0,14% 59 0,9125 -0,54% 91 0,6845 0,22% 119 0,6946
Before [-20, -2] -4,39% 37 0,2164 -0,37% 36 0,7486 1,47% 29 0,2345 0,11% 44 0,8312
[-1, 1] -2,56% 37 0,0009 *** -1,33% 36 0,0056 *** 2,44% 29 0,4631 4,84% 44 0,0101 **
[2, 20] -2,45% 37 0,2280 -0,14% 36 0,5237 -4,15% 29 0,5143 -3,69% 44 0,3547
During [-20, -2] -3,32% 12 0,7512 -0,37% 5 0,9324 3,32% 35 0,0080 *** 3,39% 28 0,0311 **
[-1, 1] -0,51% 12 0,8233 -1,33% 5 0,6092 2,24% 35 0,0326 ** 5,70% 28 0,0004 ***
[2, 20] 0,59% 12 0,7084 -0,14% 5 0,6560 -0,29% 35 0,6321 3,43% 28 0,0926 *
After [-20, -2] -0,41% 52 0,8899 -0,37% 18 0,1423 -1,17% 27 0,2695 0,26% 47 0,1114
[-1, 1] -0,69% 52 0,0029 *** -1,33% 18 0,2770 -0,07% 27 0,7860 2,55% 47 0,0001 ***
[2, 20] 0,15% 52 0,7053 -0,14% 18 0,1075 -0,27% 27 0,7089 -0,05% 47 0,6065
Stable [-20, -2] -0,37% 89 0,4102 -0,37% 54 0,2905 -0,16% 56 0,6281 0,25% 91 0,3666
[-1, 1] -1,33% 89 0,0000 *** -1,33% 54 0,0031 *** 0,84% 56 0,3616 3,26% 91 0,0000 ***
[2, 20] -0,14% 89 0,1918 -0,14% 54 0,9907 -0,28% 56 0,3584 0,00% 91 0,5905
*  Significance at 10%
**  Significance at 5%
***  Significance at 1%
 
 
Appendix 5 – Complementary regressions 
In this Appendix, complementary regressions are provided for some of the main results. In 
particular, the results concerning the stronger anticipation for the negative events during crisis 
as well as the reduced informational importance of pooled positive events during recession is 
strengthened by these regressions.  
 
Concerning possible downgrades, the anticipation window [-20,-2] is the dependent variable 
while the Crisis_Dummy is the explanatory dummy-variable. The Crisis_Dummy takes the 
value one if the anticipation window is observed during the crisis, and otherwise taking the 
value zero. One can see that the coefficient for the Crisis_Dummy variable is estimated to 
10% and show significance at 5% level. 
 
Further, by observing the same regression for downgrades we see that the additional 
anticipation during crisis is estimated to 9% that is also found significant at the 5% level. 
 
Lastly, the regression for pooled positive events where [-1,1] is now the dependent variable, 
the intercept is significant at 1%, with the coefficient -4%. Further, as the Crisis_Dummy 
coefficient is estimated to 4% and as it is the additional reaction to the intercept, the total 
estimated reaction for positive events around the event day is zero percent during recession.  
 
Table Dummy regression (possible downgrades)
Dummy variable regression estimating the additional impact at [-20,-2] for 
possible downgrades during crisis. The estimated model is;
CAR(-20,-2) = Intercept  +  (Additional_anticip) x Crisis_Dummy
Estimated Coefficient Std.error p-value
Intercept 0,03 0,0220 0,1390
Crisis_Dummy 0,10 0,0454 0,0274 **
R
2
/Adj. R
2 0,04/0,03
Observations n=119
* Significance at 10%,    ** Significance at 5%,    *** Significance at 1%
Table  Dummy regression (downgrades)
Dummy variable regression estimating the additional impact at [-20,-2] for 
downgrades during crisis. The estimated model is;
CAR(-20,-2) = Intercept  +  (Additional_anticip) x Crisis_Dummy
Estimated Coefficient Std.error p-value
Intercept 0,03 0,0258 0,2638
Crisis_Dummy 0,09 0,0435 0,0337 **
R
2
/Adj. R
2 0,05/0,04
Observations n=91
* Significance at 10%,    ** Significance at 5%,    *** Significance at 1%
Table  Dummy regression (pooled positive)
Dummy variable regression estimating the additional impact at [-1,1] for 
pooled positive events during crisis. The estimated model is;
CAR(-1,-1) = Intercept  +  (Additional_rection) x Crisis_Dummy
Estimated Coefficient Std.error p-value
Intercept -0,04 0,0061 0,0000 ***
Crisis_Dummy 0,04 0,0187 0,0524 *
R
2
/Adj. R
2 0,02/0,02
Observations n=160
* Significance at 10%,    ** Significance at 5%,    *** Significance at 1%
